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With a view toward the characteristics that make Alaska unique 
for change of venue analysis, this Article reviews how the criminal 
justice system in general, and Alaska in particular, has addressed 
the impact of prejudicial pretrial publicity on the right of a crimi-
nal defendant to a fair trial by an impartial jury.  It provides an 
overview of the development of the concept of “presumed preju-
dice,” as opposed to “actual prejudice” demonstrated in jury voir 
dire, and then explores why voir dire is never an appropriate tool 
for presumed prejudice review. This overview is followed by a 
critical look at the application of the principle of presumed preju-
dice in change of venue litigation in Alaska state courts. 
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Next, the Article examines two Alaska federal criminal cases in 
which a public opinion survey supported a motion for change of 
venue.  The Article argues that a valid public opinion survey is an 
invaluable measure of the real impact of prejudicial pretrial pub-
licity on a potential jury pool and should be utilized in high-
profile cases when juror prejudice is likely.  However, recognizing 
that this tool may not always be a viable option, the Article sug-
gests an alternative method for exposing possible juror prejudice, 
and concludes that, at a minimum, trial courts, especially those in 
Alaska, should carefully and independently weigh the concept of 
presumed prejudice when considering the proper venue for sensa-
tionalized criminal cases. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In October 19, 1990, Raymond Cheely was driving on the 
Glenn Highway in Anchorage, Alaska with two friends, Doug 
Gustafson and George Kerr.  Gustafson was holding an HK-91 
semi-automatic assault rifle in the front seat.1  After an incident 
with another car on the highway, Gustafson fired a shot at the 
other vehicle, killing a passenger.2  This incident marked Anchor-
age’s first “drive-by” shooting and sparked a great deal of public-
ity.3 
Cheely filed a motion for a change of venue outside of An-
chorage.4  In support of his motion, he submitted more than 
twenty-four newspaper articles that addressed the shooting, the ar-
rests of the defendants, and the trial and conviction of co-
defendant Gustafson.5  The coverage described Cheely as a lead 
troublemaker6 and group leader,7 and both men were labeled “gun 
nuts.”8  Several articles stated that Cheely maneuvered the car so 
that Gustafson could get a clear shot, that police suspected Cheely 
hid the murder weapon, and that both men had threatened others 
not to testify against them.9  The articles also discussed a burglary 
and theft that the two men were suspected of committing.10  De-
 
 1. Cheely v. State, 861 P.2d 1168, 1169 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993). 
 2. Id. at 1169–70. 
 3. Id. at 1170–73. 
 4. Id. at 1170. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 1171. 
 7. Id. at 1179. 
 8. Id. at 1171. 
 9. Id. at 1171–73. 
 10. Id.  These newspaper articles were in addition to an earlier wave of public-
ity about Gustafson’s trial, held two weeks prior to Cheely’s trial.  The testimony 
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spite this intense media coverage, the court ruled that a change of 
venue was not required.11  Cheely was convicted of second-degree 
murder and sentenced to sixty years imprisonment.12 
The struggle to protect criminal defendants charged with sen-
sational crimes from exposure to “the media circus” can be traced 
in American jurisprudence back to the trial of Aaron Burr in 
1807.13  The former Vice President had been charged with treason 
for planning the seizure of New Orleans and the invasion of Mex-
ico in defiance of President Jefferson.14  The charge of treason 
against Colonel Burr was the focus of the media and saturated Vir-
ginia newspapers, which informed the jurors in great detail of 
events and proceedings leading up to the trial.15  The Virginia press 
described a purported grand plan of insurrection, where Burr 
would invade Mexico, detach the southwest from the United 
States, and form an empire stretching from the Mississippi Valley 
to Mexico City.16 
Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall, who presided 
over Burr’s trial, had to confront the effect of pretrial publicity on 
the prospective jurors.17  The concern was and is that pretrial pub-
licity will impair the Sixth Amendment guarantee that “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed.”18  In his opinion, 
Chief Justice Marshall recognized the importance of an impartial 
jury: 
The great value of the trial by jury certainly consists in its fair-
ness and impartiality.  Those who most prize the institution, 
prize it because it furnishes a tribunal which may be expected to 
be uninfluenced by an undue bias of the mind . . . . Why do per-
sonal prejudices constitute a just cause of challenge?  Solely be-
cause the individual who is under their influence is presumed to 
have a bias on his mind which will prevent an impartial decision 
 
at Gustafson’s trial and the testimony reported by the media echoed most of the 
prejudicial reports about Cheely.  Id. 
 11. Id. at 1175–76. 
 12. Id. at 1169. 
 13. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1807) (No. 14,692g) [here-
inafter Burr I]. 
 14. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 201, 202–06 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1807) (No. 
14,694a) [hereinafter Burr II]. 
 15. Id. at 203–04. 
 16. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL 
OF DEMOCRACY 38 (1994). 
 17. Id. at 43–44. 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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of the case, according to the testimony.  He may declare that 
notwithstanding these prejudices he is determined to listen to 
the evidence, and be governed by it; but the law will not trust 
him.  Is there less reason to suspect him who has prejudged the 
case, and has deliberately formed and delivered an opinion upon 
it?  Such a person may believe that he will be regulated by testi-
mony, but the law suspects him, and certainly not without rea-
son.19 
While Chief Justice Marshall was clearly concerned about pro-
tecting the defendant’s express rights under the United States Con-
stitution, he also recognized that both procedural and substantive 
justice can be compromised by an underlying, immutable fact of 
human nature: the opinions of others can inform and direct the de-
cisions of jurors, often in subtle ways impossible to detect in a pub-
lic courtroom.20  Acknowledgment of this fact is an inherent com-
ponent of the court’s duty to ensure overall justice.21  Otherwise, 
regardless of how fair the actual procedure and the subsequent re-
sults appear, the integrity of a jury verdict, and thus the judicial sys-
tem, will always be questioned in an environment polluted by sus-
picions of bias.22  Consequently, Chief Justice Marshall also realized 
that the trial court has a duty to independently assess, and possibly 
presume, partiality, even in spite of a juror’s denial of bias.23  The 
Chief Justice began a rigorous voir dire of prospective jurors on 
August 3, 1807.24  Forty-eight prospective jurors were examined the 
first day, and forty-four were excused after admitting to being in-
fluenced by the newspapers.25  After two weeks of voir dire, the 
panel of prospective jurors was exhausted, and a second venire was 
summoned.26 
Chief Justice Marshall did not disqualify jurors for having in-
formation and opinions on the case, so long as the prepossession 
was a “light impression” that “may leave the mind open to a fair 
consideration.”27  This rule was applied both to views on the full 
case and views on an essential element of the charge.28  Further-
more, regardless of what a juror claimed, it was up to the court to 
 
 19. Burr I, 25 F. Cas. at 50. 
 20. Id. at 50–51. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. 
 24. ABRAMSON, supra note 16, at 40. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 40–42. 
 27. Burr I, 25 F. Cas. at 51. 
 28. Id. 
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determine the degree of the juror’s foregone conclusion of the de-
fendant’s guilt.29 
Unfortunately, Chief Justice Marshall’s efforts to confront the 
bias of jurors did not distinguish between presumed and actual 
prejudice.30  The only tool available to him to ferret out the impar-
tiality of jurors was his own tenacious voir dire.31  However, the 
sole use of voir dire is antithetical to the presumption-of-prejudice 
analysis.  If pretrial publicity has so permeated a community such 
that prospective jurors cannot accurately assess the depth to which 
editorial journalism32 has infiltrated their minds, voir dire of a jury 
panel from that community can be a futile exercise.  Therefore, 
unless prejudice is presumed, the judge will be making a decision 
based upon information from untrustworthy sources and, as a re-
sult, the integrity of the process will be compromised.33 
Nevertheless, in 1878, the Supreme Court entirely removed 
the concept of presumed prejudice from the inquiry into juror im-
partiality.  In Reynolds v. United States,34 the Supreme Court estab-
lished that a finding of juror bias must be based on actual evidence 
that a juror had clearly formed a biased opinion.35 
Eighty-eight years later, facing the “pervasiveness of modern 
communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity 
from the minds of the jurors,” the Supreme Court in Sheppard v. 
Maxwell36 accepted and clarified the notion of presumed preju-
dice.37  The Supreme Court reversed the conviction of Doctor Sam 
Sheppard on the principle of presumed prejudice from publicity.38  
After a thorough review of the pretrial publicity and media cover-
age of the trial, the Supreme Court found that “the state trial judge 
did not fulfill his duty to protect Sheppard from the inherently 
 
 29. Id. at 50. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Editorial journalism is also called “emotional reporting,” and is juxtaposed 
to “factual reporting.”  Judge Peter D. O’Connell, Pretrial Publicity, Change of 
Venue, Public Opinion Polls: A Theory of Procedural Justice, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 
169, 186–87 (1988); Vineet R. Shahani, Change the Motion, Not the Venue: A Criti-
cal Look at the Change of Venue Motion, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93, 102 (2005). 
 33. O’Connell, supra note 32, at 186–87; Shahani, supra note 32, at 102. 
 34. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 35. Id. at 155–57.  The court further held that findings of a trial court regard-
ing juror bias would not be set aside by a reviewing court unless there was mani-
fest error.  Id. at 156. 
 36. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
 37. Id. at 362. 
 38. Id. 
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prejudicial publicity which saturated the community.”39  The preju-
dice to the defendant was presumed even though all of the jurors 
asserted that they would not be influenced by outside sources of in-
formation during voir dire.40  Despite the Court’s use of the concept 
of presumed prejudice in Sheppard, confusion still surrounds pre-
sumed and actual prejudice, even within the Supreme Court. 
The premise of this Article is that Alaska courts have not been 
immune to the common mistakes made when dealing with poten-
tial juror prejudice.  Alaskan communities are especially suscepti-
ble to pretrial publicity given the relatively small state population41 
and the magnified impact of media outlets in the state.  The Alaska 
Supreme Court has endorsed the idea of presumed prejudice by 
adopting the American Bar Association’s proposed standards that 
call for a change of venue whenever there is a “substantial likeli-
hood” that a fair trial by an impartial jury cannot be had, without 
requiring a showing of actual prejudice.42  However, the guarantee 
of impartiality has been compromised in recent years in several 
high-profile state cases.43  Even while the pervasiveness of modern 
communications has increased in Alaska, and criminal caseloads 
have dramatically expanded, venue changes have been infrequent.44  
Alaska state trial and appellate courts have blurred the distinction 
between presumed and actual prejudice.45  Like trial courts 
throughout the nation, Alaska’s trial courts rely almost entirely on 
voir dire to ascertain the impact of pretrial publicity on jurors.  Due 
to erroneous assumptions about the effects of pretrial publicity on 
the public, trial courts also rely upon other equally inadequate 
tools to mitigate against the use of prejudiced jurors. 
This Article argues that, though historically the most popular 
approach, voir dire is neither an appropriate nor effective initial 
step in what must be a two-step inquiry into juror prejudice.  First, 
prior to the jury selection process, trial courts need to examine 
carefully the possibility of presumed prejudice when the issue is 
raised.  Second, if necessary, actual prejudice should be separately 
 
 39. Id. at 363. 
 40. Id. at 354  n.9. 
 41. The U.S. Census Bureau 2004 population estimate for Alaska was 655,435.  
U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/02000.html. 
 42. See Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d 737, 748 (Alaska 1980) (citing ABA 
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FAIR 
TRIAL AND FREE PRESS § 8-3.3(c) (2d ed. Tentative Draft 1978)). 
 43. See discussion infra pt. II. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. 
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explored during voir dire.  This separate analysis for presumed and 
actual prejudice is especially critical in a state like Alaska. 
In addition to voir dire, the Federal Defender Office for the 
District of Alaska has utilized another instrument to measure the 
impact of pretrial publicity in two high-profile federal cases.46  That 
tool is a public opinion survey of the prospective jury pool con-
ducted by a market research corporation using scientific marketing 
and survey techniques.  In United States v. Cheely (Cheely II),47 that 
research persuaded the United States District Court for Alaska to 
grant a motion for a change of venue in a mail-bombing murder 
trial.48  In United States v. Maad,49 the district court declined to 
grant a change of venue based on prejudicial pretrial publicity that 
was supported by a public opinion survey.  However, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s holding.50  In 
these two cases, public opinion surveys demonstrated bias in the 
communities from which jurors were drawn, even two years after 
the crime in Cheely,51 and despite the failure to show actual preju-
dice during jury selection in Maad.52 
Part II of this Article reviews the evolution of presumed preju-
dice from pretrial publicity doctrine, culminating in the Sheppard v. 
Maxwell53 decision.  Part III explains the ineffectiveness of tradi-
tional methods of maintaining a just judicial system when it comes 
to defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights and focuses on the misap-
plication of the voir dire process to presumed-prejudice review.  
Part IV applies these principles to the evaluation of prejudice 
analysis by Alaska state courts.  Part V describes the experience of 
the Alaska Federal Defender Office in utilizing a public opinion 
survey to support change of venue motions in the Cheely and Maad 
cases.  The section hypothesizes why public opinion surveys would 
more accurately reflect community sentiment about a high-profile 
case, and, consequently, be more effective than voir dire in expos-
ing juror bias.  Part V also presents a viable alternative to a full-
 
 46. Michael T. Nietzel & Ronald C. Dillehay, Psychologists as Consultants for 
Changes of Venue: The Use of Public Opinion Surveys, 7 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 
309, 310–13 (1983). 
 47. 814 F. Supp. 1430 (D. Alaska 1992).  Cheely II involved a criminal prose-
cution for a mail-bombing allegedly orchestrated by Cheely while in prison for the 
drive-by shooting.  See discussion infra pt. V(A). 
 48. Id. at 1433. 
 49. 75 Fed. App’x 599 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 50. Id. at 601. 
 51. 814 F. Supp. at 1433. 
 52. Maad, 75 Fed. App’x at 601. 
 53. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
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scale public opinion survey, which utilizes a scientifically-designed 
jury questionnaire. 
In conclusion, the authors suggest that principles of justice are 
threatened by the failure to differentiate between presumed and 
actual prejudice.  They further argue that in an era of rapidly ad-
vancing methods of communication, Alaska trial courts must, at a 
minimum, give due consideration to the need for an independent 
analysis of presumed prejudice when deciding on the proper venue 
for high-profile criminal cases.  Voir dire should never be the basis 
of a presumed-prejudice inquiry. 
Lastly, when prejudice can be fairly presumed, trial courts 
should not hesitate to change venue.  The large geographic expanse 
of Alaska offers many alternative sites where pretrial publicity 
would not be an issue.  Trials moved between Anchorage, Fair-
banks, and Juneau can avoid the influence of local media coverage.  
In rural communities, the courts have the option of other venues 
within the judicial district or larger cities outside the district. 
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF PRESUMED  
PREJUDICE IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Act One:  The Curtain Opens on the Media Circus 
The legal principle of the “impartial juror” has been severely 
tested by the twentieth-century media age.  The specter of what has 
come to be known as the first “circus trial” leapt into the public 
spotlight in 1935.54  The trial of Bruno Hauptmann for kidnapping 
the Lindbergh baby55 generated such unprecedented media expo-
sure that the American Bar Association (“ABA”) adopted Canon 
35 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, prohibiting the photography of, 
and broadcast from, court proceedings,56 out of fear of “the de-
grad[ation] [of] the court and . . . misconceptions with respect 
thereto in the mind of the public.”57  The Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure codified this cannon shortly thereafter,58 as well as the 
provision for a change of venue upon motion by the defendant if 
“so great a prejudice against the defendant exists . . . that the de-
fendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial.”59  In 1941, Su-
 
 54. New Jersey v. Hauptmann, 180 A. 809 (N.J. 1935). 
 55. Id. at 813. 
 56. Id. 
 57. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 35 (1937). 
 58. This type of media coverage is prohibited except as otherwise provided by 
statute.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 53. 
 59. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a). 
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preme Court Justice Hugo Black summed up the issue in a state-
ment often repeated in the jurisprudence of pretrial publicity: “Le-
gal trials are not like elections, to be won through the use of the 
meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper.”60 
In spite of Justice Black’s admonition, “trial by media” con-
tinued to plague the criminal justice system as information tech-
nology advanced into the second half of the twentieth century.  The 
Supreme Court addressed the issue in Stroble v. California.61  
There, the Court reviewed the conviction of Fred Stroble for the 
murder of a six-year-old girl in Los Angeles County in 1949.62  Un-
der attention-grabbing headlines, the media coverage of Stroble’s 
arrest described his confession.63 
Stroble was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 
death.64  The Supreme Court of California unanimously affirmed 
the conviction and death sentence.65  Although the United States 
Supreme Court acknowledged that the district attorney’s release of 
Stroble’s confession to the press for widespread distribution was 
prejudicial, the majority found that the petitioner had “failed to 
show that the newspaper accounts aroused against him such preju-
dice in the community as to necessarily prevent a fair trial.”66  In 
dissent, Justice Frankfurter stated emphatically that 
[p]recisely because the feeling of the outside world cannot, with 
the utmost care, be kept wholly outside the courtroom[,] every 
endeavor must be taken in a civilized trial to keep it outside.  To 
have the prosecutor himself feed the press with evidence that no 
self-restrained press ought to publish in anticipation of a trial is 
to make the State itself through the prosecutor, who wields its 
power, a conscious participant in trial by newspaper, instead of 
by those methods which centuries of experience have shown to 
be indispensable to the fair administration of justice.67 
By 1959, the Supreme Court decided to take action against 
“trial by media” in Marshall v. United States.68  Howard Marshall 
was convicted of unlicensed dispensing of drugs in the United 
 
 60. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941). 
 61. 343 U.S. 181 (1952). 
 62. Id. at 183–84. 
 63. The confession was released to the press by the district attorney and the 
headlines proclaimed that the defendant was, among other things, a “werewolf,” 
“fiend,” and “sex-mad killer.”  Id. at 192. 
 64. Id. at 183. 
 65. Id. at 184. 
 66. Id. at 193. 
 67. Id. at 201 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 68. 360 U.S. 310 (1959). 
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States District Court for the District of Colorado.69  The Supreme 
Court reversed the conviction when, due to newspaper coverage, 
seven members of the jury learned of the defendant’s criminal his-
tory of practicing medicine without a license despite the trial 
court’s ruling that this evidence was inadmissible.70  The Supreme 
Court held that “[t]he prejudice to the defendant is almost certain 
to be as great when that evidence reaches the jury through news 
accounts as when it is a part of the prosecution’s evidence.”71 
In 1961, the Supreme Court vacated a defendant’s conviction 
in Irvin v. Dowd,72 where the impact of prejudicial publicity was 
demonstrated in the voir dire of the jury.73  The trial had become 
the cause célèbre of the small community with the local media cov-
ering the defendant’s extensive criminal history and discussing his 
guilt and punishment.74  The jury panel admitted to exposure to the 
detailed pretrial publicity and to opinions that reflected the public-
ity.75  But under questioning by the trial judge, the final panel 
stated they could still maintain impartiality.76  Thus, the Indiana 
courts found that Irvin did not establish “manifest” prejudice.77 
The Supreme Court, however, found that a review of the voir 
dire of prospective jurors demonstrated prejudice where ninety 
percent of questioned jurors expressed a presumption of guilt.78  
Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, summarized the state 
of “trial by media” at that time: 
Not a Term passes without this Court being importuned to re-
view convictions, had in States throughout the country, in which 
substantial claims are made that a jury trial has been distorted 
because of inflammatory newspaper accounts—too often, as in 
this case, with the prosecutor’s collaboration—exerting pressures 
upon potential jurors before trial and even during the course of 
trial, thereby making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
secure a jury capable of taking in, free of prepossessions, evi-
dence submitted in open court.79 
 
 69. Id. at 310. 
 70. Id. at 311–12. 
 71. Id. at 312–13. 
 72. 366 U.S. 717 (1961). 
 73. Id. at 728–29. 
 74. Id. at 725. 
 75. See id. at 725–29. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. at 724–25. 
 78. Id. at 727. 
 79. Id. at 730 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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B. Act Two: Enter Presumed Prejudice 
By 1963, the Supreme Court was ready to make the move to 
the concept of presumed prejudice.  Before trial in Rideau v. Lou-
isiana,80 the local media televised an “interview” of the defendant, 
where he admitted with specificity to the commission of a robbery, 
kidnapping, and murder.81 The trial court refused to excuse three 
potential jurors for cause, even though they admitted to seeing 
Rideau’s televised confession.82  The jury convicted Rideau, and he 
was sentenced to death.83 
The Supreme Court had little difficulty presuming that Rideau 
had been denied a fair trial, finding the trial to be a “hollow for-
mality.”84 The Supreme Court reversed Rideau’s conviction and re-
quired a new trial in a different venue.85 
The doctrine of presumed prejudice was most clearly illus-
trated in 1966 in Sheppard v. Maxwell.86  Dr. Sam Sheppard was 
charged with the murder of his wife.87  The case was the ultimate 
spectacle.88  Newspapers published many details and rumors never 
presented in court.89  A coroner’s inquest was conducted in a school 
gymnasium to accommodate the press.90  Trial jurors, who were not 
sequestered, were constantly exposed to this media coverage.91  
 
 80. 373 U.S. 723 (1963). 
 81. Id. at 724–25. 
 82. Id.  Rideau had exhausted his peremptory challenges. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 726. 
 85. Id. Rideau was twice tried in Baton Rouge, Louisiana and each time con-
victed and sentenced to death.  Rideau v. Whitley, 237 F.3d 472, 476 (5th Cir. 
2000).  After more than ten years on Louisiana’s death row, his death sentence 
was vacated under the holding of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).  Id.  His 
conviction was vacated by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2000, and Rideau 
was released from the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola after forty years.  Id. 
at 489.  
 Rideau went on to become one of the best known prisoners in America and 
an award-winning journalist.  See Wilbert Rideau, http://www.wilbertrideau.com 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2005).  In 1992, he was recognized by Life Magazine as “The 
Most Rehabilitated Prisoner in America.”  Id. 
 86. 384 U.S. 333 (1966); see discussion supra pt. I. 
 87. 384 U.S. at 335. 
 88. Id. at 337–49.  The description of the media coverage from investigation 
through trial occupies thirteen pages of the Sheppard opinion.  Id. 
 89. Id. at 356–57. 
 90. See id. at 339. 
 91. Id. at 345, 353. 
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Yet, the trial court did not grant the defendant’s requests for a 
change of venue.92 
Reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court accurately pre-
dicted that both the trial and appellate courts would be facing in-
creasingly more difficult challenges in protecting criminal defen-
dants from pretrial publicity: 
Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and the dif-
ficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the ju-
rors, the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that 
the balance is never weighed against the accused.  And appellate 
tribunals have the duty to make an independent evaluation of 
the circumstances.93 
C. Act Three: Confusion Returns 
During the final decades of the twentieth century, modern 
communications had expanded exponentially.  Simultaneously, the 
courts struggled to maintain the balance between the competing 
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to a 
fair trial.94  In 1975, the Supreme Court modified the concept of 
presumed prejudice in the case of Murphy v. Florida.95 
Jack Murphy was arrested in 1968 in Dade County, Florida 
and charged with burglary and robbery of a Miami Beach home.96  
Murphy had previously been convicted of the 1964 theft of the Star 
of India sapphire and was referred to in the media as “Murph the 
Surf.”97  After being convicted of a murder in Broward County, 
Florida and pleading guilty to federal charges involving stolen se-
curities, Murphy was convicted of robbery by a jury in Dade 
County in 1970.98 
Murphy argued in the Supreme Court that prejudice should 
have been presumed in his case since all of the jurors were aware of 
either the Star of India theft or the Broward County murder con-
viction.99  The Court, however, distinguished this case from the 
“conceded circumstances”100 of the earlier Supreme Court cases: 
The proceedings in these [other] cases were entirely lacking in 
the solemnity and sobriety to which a defendant is entitled in a 
 
 92. Id. at 352. 
 93. Id. at 362. 
 94. See Nietzel & Dillehay, supra note 46, at 310. 
 95. 421 U.S. 794 (1975). 
 96. Id. at 795. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 796, 798. 
 100. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 725 (1963). 
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system that subscribes to any notion of fairness and rejects the 
verdict of a mob. They cannot be made to stand for the proposi-
tion that juror exposure to information about a state defendant’s 
prior convictions or to news accounts of the crime with which he 
is charged alone presumptively deprives the defendant of due 
process.101 
The court then announced a new, albeit vague, standard for assess-
ing presumed prejudice: “To resolve this case, we must turn, there-
fore, to any indications in the totality of circumstances that peti-
tioner’s trial was not fundamentally fair.”102  After reviewing the 
voir dire of the jurors, the Supreme Court was convinced that, in 
the totality of the circumstances, Murphy’s trial was fundamentally 
fair.103 
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided Patton v. Yount.104  Jon 
Yount had been convicted of murder and rape in a Pennsylvania 
state court in 1966 and sentenced to life imprisonment.105  His con-
viction was reversed, and he was retried in 1970.106  He was again 
convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life.107  Yount re-
quested a change of venue multiple times before the second trial.108 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari “to consider, in the con-
text of this case, the problem of pervasive media publicity that now 
arises so frequently in the trial of sensational criminal cases.”109  
The Court found that the record in Yount’s case did not “reveal 
the kind of ‘wave of public passion’ that would have made a fair 
trial unlikely by the jury that was empaneled as a whole.”110  The 
court also noted that, while Irvin held “that adverse publicity can 
create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the ju-
rors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed,”111 it 
also raised the standard of review for overturning the trial court’s 
finding of impartiality, to the level of “manifest error.”112 
Murphy and Yount reinforce the concept that trial by an im-
partial, unbiased jury is a fundamental pillar of due process.  Nev-
ertheless, the conclusion of those two decisions sounded a retreat 
 
 101. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. at 803. 
 104. 467 U.S. 1025 (1984). 
 105. Id. at 1027. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1028. 
 108. Id. at 1027. 
 109. Id. at 1031. 
 110. Id. at 1040. 
 111. Id. at 1031. 
 112. Id. 
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by the Supreme Court from the standards of “presumed prejudice” 
established in Rideau and its progeny.  The balance between free-
dom of the press and the impartial jury shifted dramatically toward 
acceptance of sensational media coverage, raising the bar of estab-
lishing presumed prejudice for criminal defendants. 
III.  THE WOEFUL INEFFECTIVENESS OF TRADITIONAL METHODS 
OF MITIGATING AGAINST JUROR PREJUDICE 
In 1952, in Stroble v. California, Justice Frankfurter bemoaned 
that 
[s]cience with all its advances has not given us instruments for 
determining when the impact of such newspaper exploitation has 
spent itself or whether the powerful impression bound to be 
made by such inflaming articles as here preceded the trial can be 
dissipated in the mind of the average juror by the tame and often 
pedestrian proceedings in court.113 
Thankfully, this is no longer true.  There is a plethora of notewor-
thy empirical studies that demonstrate the impact of pretrial pub-
licity on juror decision-making.114 
This is important because the voir dire process has repeatedly 
been recognized as a woefully ineffective device for determining 
whether prejudice should be presumed.115  There are a number of 
possible explanations for why voir dire is not conducive to juror 
candor. 
First, people are intimidated by the judicial system and the 
courtroom environment.  The pressure of voir dire examination has 
actually caused some jurors to forget their own name.116 
Second, people generally do not like to admit that they have 
been influenced by the media, gossip, or rumor. 
 
 113. 343 U.S. 181, 201 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also discussion 
supra pt. II.A. 
 114. See generally O’Connell, supra note 32 (providing an overview of the latest 
studies done using both field and experimental methods); Shahani, supra note 32; 
Christina A. Studebaker & Steven D. Penrod, Pretrial Publicity: The Media, the 
Law, and Common Sense, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 428 (1997). 
 115. See, e.g., Dale W. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 
38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503 (1965); O’Connell, supra note 32, at 173–74, 178; Shahani, 
supra note 32, at 104–05; Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 114, at 440–43; David 
L. Suggs & Bruce D. Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure in the Voir Dire: A Social Science 
Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 245, 271 (1981); Hans Ziesel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The 
Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal 
District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 528–29 (1978). 
 116. O’Connell, supra note 32, at 183. 
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Third, there is a social stigma against those who have pre-
judged someone, and publicly acknowledging one’s prejudice is dif-
ficult.  Some jurors may be embarrassed or offended when asked 
probing questions about their personal feelings on a matter and 
will consequently repress their opinions.117 
Fourth, some jurors might be unaware that they have formed 
an irrevocable bias.118  Furthermore, the point at which an impres-
sion is weak enough to be overcome, or too strong to be sup-
pressed, is difficult to ascertain.119  In the words of Judge Peter 
O’Connell, asking a juror whether he or she can render a fair and 
impartial verdict is “a little like asking a practicing alcoholic if he 
has his drinking under control . . . .”120  Moreover, once an undesir-
able thought is identified, keeping it out of one’s mind becomes a 
formidable paradox.121  Thus, modified jury instructions and the de-
liberative process will have little positive impact on a prejudiced ju-
ror.122  In fact, studies have shown that deliberation and judicial 
admonitions actually further entrench bias in juries.123 
Fifth, some may doubt that an opinion is strong enough to 
cloud judgment permanently on a case, and any claim otherwise 
will be viewed as a veiled attempt to avoid jury duty or as a failure 
to take one’s civic duty seriously.  Last, some people will do any-
thing to be involved in a high-profile case.124 
In addition to the use of modified jury instructions and an em-
phasis on the deliberative process, other approaches have been 
taken to combat the problems generated by high-profile cases, in-
cluding the granting of continuances in the hopes that “the passage 
of time will dampen the effects of the prejudicial attitudes preva-
lent in the community.”125  However, not only do psychologists 
doubt this, but it assumes that the publicity will cease and not begin 
again once trial resumes.126 
 
 117. See id. 
 118. Shahani, supra note 32, at 105; Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 114, at 
449. 
 119. Shahani, supra note 32, at 100. 
 120. O’Connell, supra note 32, at 183. 
 121. Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 114, at 447. 
 122. See id. at 440–41 
 123. Shahani, supra note 32, at 105. 
 124. O’Connell, supra note 32, at 179 (citing Suggs & Sales, supra note 115, at 
246). 
 125. O’Connell, supra note 32, at 177. 
 126. Id. at 177–78; Shahani, supra note 32, at 104–05; Studebaker & Penrod, 
supra note 114, at 439–40. 
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The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice suggest that individ-
ual examinations of each prospective juror take place in private127 
and recommend a lengthier voir dire with additional peremptory 
challenges when pretrial prejudice is likely.128  However, this can 
make the process extremely time-consuming, and it presupposes 
that additional poking and prodding of jurors by judges and attor-
neys will expose prejudice that would otherwise have gone unde-
tected.  So far, research in the area has found that neither judges’ 
nor attorneys’ causal or peremptory challenges are related to con-
viction rates129 and that “extended voir dire [is] no more effective at 
eliminating the biasing effect of pretrial publicity than . . . minimal 
voir dire.”130 
IV.  PRESUMED PREJUDICE IN ALASKA 
Alaska has always taken pride in having state constitutional 
protections that often go beyond those of the national constitution 
and in zealously protecting the right to a jury trial.  The Alaska Su-
preme Court has consistently given the right to a jury trial under 
the Alaska Constitution a more expansive interpretation than the 
United States Supreme Court has under the Sixth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.131  Not surprisingly, the Alaska 
Constitution specifically guarantees the right to an impartial jury.132  
This right was supported by Alaska Statute 22.10.040, enacted at 
the time of statehood in 1959, which authorized the superior court 
to change the place of trial “when there is reason to believe that an 
impartial trial cannot be had.”133  Yet, Alaska trial and appellate 
courts have been increasingly reluctant to presume prejudice. 
A. The Application of Presumed Prejudice to High-Profile Cases 
by the Alaska Supreme Court 
In Alvarado v. State,134 the Alaska Supreme Court emphasized 
the importance of an impartial jury as related to the judicial sys-
tem: 
 
 127. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 8-3.5(a) (3d ed. 1992). 
 128. Id. § 8-3.5(c). 
 129. Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 114, at 441. 
 130. Id. at 442. 
 131. See generally RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971); State v. Browder, 
486 P.2d 925 (Alaska 1971); Baker v. Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970). 
 132. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11. 
 133. ALASKA STAT. § 22.10.040(1) (2004). 
 134. 486 P.2d 891 (Alaska 1971). 
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The jury, like the right to vote, is fundamentally preservative of 
ideals which are essential to our democratic system. When the 
impartiality of jurors is neglected, the injury is not limited to the 
defendant—there is injury to the jury system, to the law as an in-
stitution, to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal 
reflected in the processes of our courts.  For this reason, we must 
be ever militant to protect the notion of our juries as bodies truly 
representative of the community.135 
Nearly a decade later, the Alaska Supreme Court decided two 
cases that helped define the standards in Alaska for presumed 
prejudice within the context of prejudicial pretrial publicity.  In 
Mallott v. State,136 the court recognized the inherent difficulty in es-
tablishing prejudice through the voir dire process: 
[T]he voir dire process is not an infallible Geiger counter of ju-
ror prejudice, and to rely excessively on its efficacy in uncovering 
“actual prejudice” places an unrealistic burden on a defendant. 
Where there has been intensive pre-trial publicity, and a sub-
stantial number of venirepersons appear to have been prejudiced 
by the publicity, the probability that similar prejudices are 
shared by, but have not been extracted from, impaneled jurors 
cannot be ignored.137 
The court went on to adopt an ABA draft standard that encour-
ages a change of venue without the requirement of a showing of ac-
tual prejudice where there is a “substantial likelihood” that a trial 
by an impartial jury cannot be had.138 
Soon after the Mallott decision, in Oxereok v. State,139 the 
Alaska Supreme Court applied the ABA proposal and reversed a 
murder conviction based on a denial of a defendant’s motion for 
change of venue.140  The court found that “[t]he record of the voir 
dire examination of Oxereok’s jury panel [did] not reveal that any 
of the impaneled jurors were in fact predisposed to convict him.”141  
 
 135. Id. at 904 (internal quotation and citation omitted); see Browder, 486 P.2d 
at 937 (“[T]he right to jury trial holds a central position in the framework of 
American justice . . . . [T]he accused’s right to fair trial [must be accorded pri-
macy] against considerations of convenience or expediency to the state.”). 
 136. 608 P.2d 737 (Alaska 1980). 
 137. Id. at 748. 
 138. “A motion for change of venue or continuance shall be granted whenever 
it is determined that, because of the dissemination of potentially prejudicial mate-
rial, there is a substantial likelihood that, in the absence of such relief, a fair trial 
by an impartial jury cannot be had . . . .  A showing of actual prejudice shall not be 
required.”  Id. (citing ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal 
Justice, Fair Trial and Free Press § 8-3.3(c) (2d ed. Tentative Draft 1978)). 
 139. 611 P.2d 913 (Alaska 1980). 
 140. Id. at 919. 
 141. Id. 
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However, the court, relying on Mallott, also concluded that because 
of the inflammatory nature of pretrial publicity, a showing of actual 
prejudice was not required.142 
The Alaska Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of pre-
sumed prejudice from pretrial publicity since 1980.  The Alaska 
Court of Appeals, however, has applied the Mallott decision to 
numerous high-profile criminal cases over the past twenty-five 
years.  In only one case has the court of appeals reversed a convic-
tion based on the failure of the trial court to grant a change of 
venue.143 
B. The Application of Presumed Prejudice to High-Profile Cases 
by the Alaska Court of Appeals 
1. Newcomb v. State.144  In 1987, Gary Newcomb was charged 
with shooting two Anchorage police officers who were attempting 
to arrest him.145  Newcomb had escaped from the Wildwood Cor-
rectional Center in Kenai where he was imprisoned for robbery, 
and had been on the lam for five months.146  During Newcomb’s at-
tempted arrest, he grabbed one of the officer’s service revolvers 
and shot both officers.147  He escaped again, only to be arrested by 
Anchorage police later that night.148  Newcomb repeatedly moved 
for a change of venue,149 relying on the “Mallott standard” of pre-
sumed prejudice,150 but the trial court denied each motion.151 
The court of appeals recognized that Newcomb’s crimes re-
ceived intensive pretrial publicity.152  At least thirty-three articles 
relating to the case appeared in Anchorage newspapers prior to 
trial.153  Additional newspaper articles appeared during jury selec-
tion in Anchorage, and the trial garnered significant attention in 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. See Nickolai v. State, 708 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
 144. 800 P.2d 935 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990). 
 145. Id. at 937. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. “The normal rule requiring a showing of actual prejudice must be relaxed, 
however, when a case generates ‘intensive pretrial publicity’ that results in ‘a sub-
stantial number of venirepersons [who] appear to have been prejudiced . . . .’” Id. 
at 938 (citing Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d, 737, 748 (Alaska 1980)). 
 151. Newcomb, 800 P.2d at 937. 
 152. Id. at 938. 
 153. Id. 
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the broadcast media.154  Of the seventy-eight venirepersons ques-
tioned during voir dire, twenty-eight were excused for cause due to 
exposure to pretrial publicity or familiarity with various aspects of 
the case.155  The court found that twenty-eight disqualified panel 
members qualified as a “substantial number of venire persons” in 
order to apply the “Mallott standard.”156 
The court went on to examine the factors that would be rele-
vant in gauging the likelihood of “unrevealed jury prejudice” nec-
essary to compel a change of venue.157  The first factor was the 
“precise nature of the pretrial publicity.”158  The court stated that 
“[t]he potential for unrevealed jury prejudice can be expected to 
increase when publicity is inherently prejudicial or inflamma-
tory.”159  The examples cited by the court included media reports of 
confessions and “other significant evidence that is suppressed or 
otherwise inadmissible”; details that will be disputed by the defen-
dant at trial; and “emotionally charged editorials,” including ac-
counts of the defendant’s criminal history or character.160 
The second factor considered by the court was the timing of 
pretrial publicity.161  The court felt that even when jury voir dire es-
tablishes that many prospective jurors have been exposed to 
“highly inflammatory publicity,” such “exposure will be entitled to 
less weight if it appears that the passage of time has blunted its im-
pact on the panel.”162 
The third factor was the nature of the community in which the 
trial is conducted.163  The Newcomb court’s greatest concern was 
the possibility of unrevealed jury prejudice for crimes tried in small 
communities.164 
Using these factors, the court of appeals concluded that the 
trial court had not abused its discretion in denying a change of 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 939. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id.  See Oxereok v. State, 611 P.2d 913 (Alaska 1980) (tried in Nome, 
Alaska); Jerrel v. State, 756 P.2d 301 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (tried in Homer, 
Alaska); Nickolai v. State, 708 P.2d 1292 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (tried in 
Dillingham, Alaska). 
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venue.165  The court found that little of the pretrial publicity was 
“particularly inflammatory or inherently prejudicial.”166  The bulk 
of the pretrial publicity concerning Newcomb’s case occurred “well 
before trial.”167  Moreover, the court found it significant that the 
trial was held in Anchorage, “a relatively large community in which 
even extensive pretrial publicity can be expected to have limited 
impact.”168 
Several aspects of this case and its tripartite test are notewor-
thy.  First, the presumed prejudice analysis was based in large part 
on the voir dire record.169  Second, the judge assumed that the pas-
sage of time eroded the harmful effects of pretrial publicity, which 
does not appear to have been the case.170  Third, the court was es-
pecially reluctant to acknowledge the impact of pretrial publicity in 
Anchorage.171  Despite being Alaska’s largest city, the population 
of the Anchorage Borough was only 225,170,172 which, relative to 
jurisdictions in other states, is a small jurisdiction, and, therefore, 
more likely to be affected by pretrial publicity.173  Overall, the 
court’s dubious premises, which are built into its multi-step test, re-
surface in all of the state cases that follow. 
2. Cheely v. State.174  At Cheely’s trial for second-degree mur-
der in Anchorage’s first “drive-by” shooting, twenty of the seventy 
potential jurors were excused for cause because they had formed 
opinions about the case based on media coverage.175  The appellate 
court felt that Cheely’s motion for a change of venue should have 
been analyzed under the “Mallott standard,” using the factors laid 
 
 165. Id. at 940. 
 166. Id. at 939. 
 167. Id.  The trial was nine months after Newcomb’s escape from Wildwood 
and four months after the shootout and his arrest in Anchorage. 
 168. Id. at 940. 
 169. See id. at 939–40. 
 170. See O’Connell, supra note 32, at 177–78; Shahani, supra note 32, at 104; 
Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 114, at 439–40. 
 171. See Newcomb, 800 P.2d at 940. 
 172. U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates and Population Distribution 
Branches, Intercensal Estimates of the Resident Population of States and Counties 
1980–1989 (Mar. 1992), http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1980s/e8089co.txt. 
According to the most recent data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the projected 
population of Anchorage in 2004 is 272,687.  U.S. Census Bureau, Population 
Estimates Program, 2004 Population Estimates, Anchorage Municipality, Alaska, 
http://factfinder.census.gov. 
 173. Shahani, supra note 32, at 114. 
 174. 861 P.2d 1168 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993); see discussion supra pt. I. 
 175. Id. at 1174. 
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out in Newcomb.176  However, not only did the court fail to address 
the “precise nature” and timing of the pretrial publicity, the analy-
sis done by the court was primarily based on the record of jury se-
lection.177  The trial court allowed the use of an extensive juror 
questionnaire and individual voir dire.178  The court of appeals con-
cluded that the trial court “could reasonably conclude that pre-trial 
publicity had made jury selection more difficult but not impossible, 
and that the jurors ultimately selected did not harbor unrevealed 
prejudices against Cheely.”179  Once more, the court emphasized 
the trial’s venue: “One fact that emerged from this individual ques-
tioning was that, in a large community such as Anchorage, many 
residents do not follow media coverage of events.”180  A public 
opinion survey would later call these assumptions into question.181 
3. Woodard v. State.182  In June 1992, Jon Woodard was 
charged with felony murder.183  In support of his motion for a 
change of venue, Woodard cited twelve newspaper articles and 
forty-five television news reports covering his case.184  The trial 
court refused to grant the motion before voir dire and denied the 
request without prejudice.185 
The trial court did, however, allow a juror questionnaire and 
individualized voir dire.186  The jury questionnaire indicated that 
ninety-five percent of the prospective jurors had been exposed to 
some pretrial publicity.187  During jury selection of the fifty-six pro-
spective jurors, twenty-four were excused for cause, and of those, 
only three were excused due to their exposure to pretrial public-
ity.188  Of the thirty-two who were not excused for cause, “all but 
one had heard something about the case and fifteen had heard or 
seen something about Woodard in the media.”189  All thirty-two 
 
 176. Id. at 1174–75. 
 177. Id. at 1175. 
 178. Id. at 1173. 
 179. Id. at 1175–76. 
 180. Id. at 1175. 
 181. See discussion infra pt. V(A). 
 182. Nos. A- 5187, 3933, 1998 WL 849246 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1998). 
 183. Id. at *1. 
 184. Id. at *10. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at *11. 
 189. Id. 
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prospective jurors “assured the court that they could hear the case 
without bias.”190 
The court of appeals, applying the “more liberal standard 
adopted by Mallott,” concluded that the record of jury selection 
supported the trial court’s refusal to grant a change of venue.191  
The appellate court found that pretrial publicity was not inherently 
prejudicial or inflammatory, even though that publicity referenced 
Woodard’s criminal history (his prior arrest on federal drug and 
weapon charges), other possible robberies police believed 
Woodard had committed, and reports of Woodard having an “ar-
senal” of weapons and paramilitary literature.192  According to the 
court, the fact that most of the publicity occurred several months 
before trial lessened its impact on prospective jurors.193  Moreover, 
since the trial was held in Anchorage, it was “reasonable to believe 
that the publicity in the case was of ‘limited impact.’”194 
4. Stavenjord v. State.195  The latest example is the murder 
trial of Paul Stavenjord in Palmer, Alaska in 1998.  Stavenjord was 
arrested after a month-long manhunt and charged with a double 
homicide.196  Over fifty television and more than a dozen published 
newspaper stories reported the manhunt during the summer of 
1997.197  Pretrial hearings in October of that year were similarly 
covered by the media.198 
Media coverage disclosed information inadmissible at trial, in-
cluding Stavenjord being expelled from school for using racial epi-
thets, a juvenile arrest and two-year sentence for robbery, an es-
cape from juvenile prison and high speed car chase, and a 1971 
armed bank robbery motivated by drugs.199 
Jury selection (after prospective jurors completed written 
questionnaires) lasted two weeks and included individual voir 
dire.200  Of 184 prospective jurors, sixty were accepted for jury se-
lection.201  Forty-seven were excused for case-related reasons, and 
 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at *12–*14. 
 192. Id. at *13. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. (citation omitted). 
 195. 66 P.3d 762 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003). 
 196. Id. at 767. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 768. 
 200. Id. at 768–69. 
 201. Id. at 768. 
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the balance were excused for reasons unrelated to the case.202  Of 
the sixty initially accepted, another twenty-six were excused be-
cause of exposure to pretrial publicity, and eleven were excused 
“because of exposure to publicity and other factors.”203  An addi-
tional juror was excused during trial after she recalled “reading or 
hearing something about Stavenjord’s robbery conviction.”204 
The court of appeals examined the record of voir dire of the 
twelve jurors and four alternates who heard the case.205  The court 
concluded that those jurors knew only the bare details of the 
crimes charged, and none of the information recalled was inflam-
matory or prejudicial.206  In addition, all of the jurors and alternates 
“expressed confidence that they could be impartial.”207  Although 
the court recognized that there was substantial pretrial publicity, it 
also considered that the trial was conducted eight months after the 
manhunt and that “in an area as physically large as the Matanuska-
Suusitna area, considering the size of its population, many people 
were not influenced by the media coverage.”208 
The appellate court consistently relies on the trial judge’s 
evaluation of “unrevealed prejudices” due to pretrial publicity, and 
the Stavenjord case was no different.  The court concluded that it 
would “affirm the superior court’s denial of the motion for change 
of venue unless [the court is] convinced, after [the court’s] own in-
dependent review of the record, that the superior court abused its 
discretion.”209 
5. Summary.  The Alaska Supreme Court has broadly ex-
panded the right to a jury trial under the Alaska Constitution.210  It 
has adopted the ABA standard that recognizes “presumed preju-
dice” as a basis for a change of venue separate from proof of “ac-
tual” prejudice during the voir dire process.211  The courts in Mallott 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 769. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. The population of the Matanuska-Susitna Borough, of which Palmer is 
part, was 53,920 in 1997.  U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates Program, 
County Population Estimates and Demographic Components of Population 
Change: Annual Time Series, July 1, 1990 to July 1, 1999 available at 
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/co-99-08/99C8_02.txt. 
 209. Stavenjord, 66 P.3d at 770. 
 210. See infra, pt. IV. 
 211. Mallott v State, 608 P.2d 737, 748 (Alaska 1980). 
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and Oxereok held that where intensive pretrial publicity has influ-
enced a community, the probability that prejudices are “shared by, 
but have not been extracted from, impaneled jurors, cannot be ig-
nored.”212  Nonetheless, the application of these principles to high-
profile cases in Alaska has been marginal.  The court of appeals has 
blurred the line between presumed and actual prejudice.  In apply-
ing the “Mallott standard,” the court has relied heavily on the re-
cord of jury selection and the discretion of the trial judge.  Fur-
thermore, unacceptable assumptions have been made when 
applying the three-part Newcomb test, when used at all.  The fail-
ure to critically analyze the nature and impact of prejudicial public-
ity on the community called upon to decide the guilt or innocence 
of a criminal defendant prior to the jury selection process jeopard-
izes the concept of an impartial jury, impugns the integrity of a jury 
verdict, and endangers justice in general.  None of these results 
should be tolerated in light of the availability of scientific public 
opinion surveys that have been able to measure the impact of pub-
licity on a community. 
V.  THE PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY AS AN  
INSTRUMENT TO MEASURE THE IMPACT OF PRETRIAL PUBLICITY 
As mass communication has spread throughout the country, 
and prejudicial media coverage saturates communities at ever in-
creasing rates, courts have struggled to strike a balance between 
the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an impartial jury and the First 
Amendment’s protection of freedom of the press.213  Legal scholars 
have characterized this balance to be between the “impartial” juror 
and the “empty mind.”214  However, to a defendant on trial in such 
an environment, it is a matter of the presumption of innocence ver-
sus the presumption of guilt and the right to a just trial untainted 
by outside influences. 
The concept of presumed prejudice, and not merely actual 
prejudice, is a useful weapon in the fight against “trial by newspa-
per.”  Therefore, when a criminal defendant is charged in a high-
profile case and requests a change of venue, three factors are criti-
cal in evaluating the issue.  The first factor is the existence of 
knowledge about the case in the community of jurors.  This in-
cludes awareness of facts or rumors that would not be admissible or 
are going to be contested by the defendant at trial.  The second fac-
tor is the “opinion of guilt” that exists within the community.  Fi-
 
 212. Id.; accord Oxereok v. State, 611 P.2d 913, 919 (Alaska 1980). 
 213. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, VI. 
 214. See ABRAMSON, supra note 16, at 45–55. 
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nally, the third factor is the strength of such opinion.  That is, 
whether prospective jurors in the community, in the words of Chief 
Justice Marshall, have a “strong,” as contrasted with a “light,” bias 
against a defendant.215 
Trial courts have traditionally relied on the voir dire process to 
measure the extent of juror bias.  However, empirical studies have 
demonstrated that the voir dire process is not effective in uncover-
ing significant biases and prejudices that jurors may bring to a 
courtroom after exposure to pretrial publicity.216  A public opinion 
survey, properly conducted, can directly address the critical factors 
of the impact of pretrial publicity prior to the voir dire process.  
Such a survey must employ the highest level of scientifically-
accepted standards for the market research industry, including 
skilled practitioners in survey design, “best practices” techniques 
for unbiased inquiries, and ethical considerations throughout the 
research process.  For this reason, though not frequently used, pub-
lic opinion polling has been recognized as an important tool in as-
sessing the need for a change of venue in high-profile cases since at 
least the 1970s.217 Fairly recently, these surveys have proven to be a 
critical tool in evaluating motions for change of venue in high-
profile cases in federal district court in Alaska.218 
A. United States v. Cheely (Cheely II)219 
In 1992, the Federal Defender for the District of Alaska was 
appointed to represent Raymond Cheely in a high-profile federal 
murder prosecution.220  Cheely, Doug Gustafson, Craig Gustafson, 
and Peggy Gustafson-Barnett were charged with conspiracy to mail 
a package bomb that caused the death of one and seriously injured 
another.221 
 
 215. Burr I, 25 F.Cas. at 51. 
 216. See Broeder, supra note 115, at 505–21; Suggs & Sales, supra note 115, at 
271; Ziesel & Diamond, supra note 115, at 528–29. 
 217. Stephen J. Arnold & Alan D. Gold, The Use of Public Opinion Poll on a 
Change of Venue Application, 21 CRIM. L.Q. 445 (1979); Nietzel & Dillehay, supra 
note 46, at 309; Arthur J. Pollock, The Use of Public Opinion Polls to Obtain 
Changes of Venue and Continuances in Criminal Trials, 1 CRIM. JUST. J. 269 
(1977); Neil Vidmar & John W. Judson, The Use of Social Science Data in a 
Change of Venue Application: A Case Study, 59 CAN. B. REV. 76, 79–92, 100 
(1981). 
 218. E.g., United States v. Cheely, A92-073 CR (JKS) (D. Alaska 1992); United 
States v. Maas, A01-0174 CR (JKS) (D. Alaska 2001). 
 219. A92-073 CR (JKS) (D. Alaska 1992). 
 220. United States v. Cheely, 790 F. Supp. 901, 902–06 (D. Alaska 1992). 
 221. United States v. Cheely, 814 F. Supp. 1430, 1433 (D. Alaska 1992). 
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Cheely and Doug Gustafson first entered the public eye in 
1990, when they were charged and convicted of a highway shoot-
ing.222  George Kerr was the third passenger in the car with Cheely 
and Doug Gustafson, and testified against the two at trial.223  The 
state murder trial against Cheely and Doug Gustafson had received 
a great deal of publicity.224  Both were convicted, and Cheely re-
ceived a sixty-year prison sentence.225 
That publicity increased with the federal indictment of Cheely 
and Doug Gustafson for masterminding the mailing of a bomb to 
Kerr’s home.226 The package was opened by Kerr’s parents, killing 
his father and seriously injuring his mother.227  Media coverage fol-
lowing the mail-bomb investigation was intense.  The defense at-
tempted to demonstrate that prejudice was induced by that public-
ity.  The Federal Defender Office hired Craciun & Associates to 
conduct a public opinion survey to assess the bias and prejudice in 
the pool of prospective jurors.228 
Craciun & Associates (“CRG”),229 an applied marketing re-
search firm based in Anchorage, had conducted more than one 
hundred public opinion surveys nationally and many in the An-
chorage area, primarily for businesses, governmental agencies, and 
political campaigns.230  CRG’s research design included a quantitive 
methodology whereby professionally trained interviewers con-
ducted telephone surveys of a representative sample of the target 
audience.231 
CRG randomly selected the survey sample from a list of regis-
tered voters residing in the Anchorage Division of the Federal Dis-
trict Court.232  Anchorage, the Mat-Su Valley, the Kenai Peninsula, 
the Aleutians and Western Alaska, Kodiak, Cordova, and Valdez, 
 
 222. Cheely v. State, 861 P.2d 1168 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993); see also discussion 
supra  pt. I. 
 223. Cheely, 861 P.2d. at 1172–73. 
 224. Id. at 1170–73. 
 225. Id. at 1169. 
 226. United States v. Cheely, A92-073 CR (JKS) (D. Alaska 1992). 
 227. United States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 228. CRACIUN & ASSOCIATES, PUBLIC OPINION STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE 
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE: IS RAYMOND CHEELY GUILTY OR NOT? 
(1992) [hereinafter CRACIUN 1992 CHEELY POLL]. 
 229. This firm is now known as Craciun Research Group, Inc. 
 230. Craciun Research Group, Inc., http://www.craciun.com/ (last visited Sept. 
27, 2005).  Although Jean Craciun, a sociologist, had conducted surveys similar to 
this one, CRG had not.  See id. 
 231. CRACIUN 1992 CHEELY POLL, supra note 228, at 3. 
 232. Id. at 4. 
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Alaska were all located within the sample area.233  The sample also 
reflected the proportion of registered voters in the State House dis-
tricts that constitute the Anchorage Division.234  According to the 
sample size of 608, if researchers had interviewed every registered 
voter meeting juror requirements in the Anchorage District, the 
findings would differ from these survey results by no more than 4.1 
percentage points in either direction.235  Thus, the margin of error 
was +/- 4.1%.236 
CRG meticulously designed questions to assess respondents’ 
awareness and perceptions of the case details.237  Their survey in-
strument identified topics for inquiry, such as media habits, knowl-
edge about case elements, feelings about the defendants’ guilt or 
innocence, knowledge of the defendants’ earlier crimes, and demo-
graphic information.238  The CRG interviewers sought to keep non-
response to a minimum, accurately record responses to all ques-
tions, answer frequently-asked questions, and use vocabulary rele-
vant to the study.239  The final report included summaries and rele-
vant frequency tables of the various responses.240 
The survey results indicated that pretrial publicity concerning 
Cheely had significantly influenced the jury pool.241  In response, 
Cheely and Doug Gustafson filed a motion for a change of venue 
in the District Court of Alaska.242  To support their motion, they at-
tached the survey results243 and presented an analysis of the news-
paper articles appearing in the Anchorage Daily News relating to 
Cheely or Gustafson for a period of twenty-two months prior to the 
federal mail-bomb conspiracy indictment.244   
After a review of the news articles and the public opinion sur-
vey results, United States District Court Judge James M. Fitzgerald 
concluded that the defendants had met the burden of establishing 
 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. See id. at 5. 
 236. Id.  Note that for subgroups the sampling error is larger. 
 237. Id. at 3. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 4. 
 240. Id. at 6. 
 241. Id. 
 242. United States v. Cheely, No. A92-073 CR (JKS) (D. Alaska Nov. 13, 1992) 
(order granting transfer of venue). 
 243. Id. at 34–35. 
 244. Id. at 9. 
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“presumed prejudice” and ordered a transfer of venue under Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(a).245 
Judge Fitzgerald’s decision summarized the primary factors to 
be examined in evaluating a claim of presumed prejudice due to 
pretrial publicity,246 including the nature, frequency, and timing of 
coverage by the media.247  The court noted that in analyzing the na-
ture of pretrial publicity, the court should distinguish between “fac-
tual reporting of the charges and reporting that proclaims the de-
fendant’s guilt or focuses on inadmissible evidence.”248  Other 
variables identified that may influence a determination of pre-
sumed prejudice include the jury pool’s size and sophistication, the 
nature of the crimes, and the victims’ anonymity.249  The final factor 
was polling data that “may show the extent to which pretrial pub-
licity had a prejudicial effect on the jury pool community.”250 
The court reviewed sixty-four newspaper articles concerning 
Cheely and Gustafson published in the Anchorage Daily News in 
the period between October 19, 1990 and August 14, 1992.251  The 
court noted that publicity concerning the defendants had substan-
tially continued from the time of the bombing through the time 
that the change of venue motion was filed, but more important 
than the frequency of the articles was their nature and substance.252  
The court stated that intense media coverage was “partially due to 
the understandable public interest in a fatal mail bombing allegedly 
directed from jail towards a witness in a criminal trial.”253  The arti-
cles consistently reported “what is said to be the facts of the case, 
the identities of the defendants, along with the details of their par-
ticipation in the mail bombing and the other charges set out in the 
indictment.”254 
As to the prejudicial nature of the coverage, the court found 
that the news media reported a number of crimes that were attrib-
uted to the defendants prior to the charges in the indictment, in-
 
 245. Id. at 39. 
 246. Id. at 5. 
 247. Id. (citing United States v. Engleman, 489 F. Supp. 48, 51 (E.D. Mo. 
1980)). 
 248. Id. (citing United States v. Dischner, Nos. 89-30333-4, slip op. at 11415 
(9th Cir. Sept. 11, 1992)). 
 249. Id. (citing Hart v. Stagner, 935 F.2d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
 250. Id. at 6 (citing United States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir. 
1982)). 
 251. See id. at 9. 
 252. Id. at 27. 
 253. Id. at 28. 
 254. Id. at 28–29. 
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formation that would probably not be admissible at trial.255  Addi-
tionally, much of the publicity tended to establish the defendants’ 
guilt by linking them to well-known confessions of alleged co-
conspirators and statements attributed to the defendants.256 
However, it was the survey that confirmed the prejudicial im-
pact of the publicity.257  Polling data demonstrated detailed and 
prejudicial knowledge of the case.258  Sixty-seven percent of the re-
spondents were able to give details of the victims, and seventy-four 
percent identified revenge as the motive of the crime.259  Thirty-five 
percent volunteered the names of one or both defendants, un-
prompted.260  Twenty-one percent recalled that the defendants had 
committed previous crimes other than the highway shooting, in-
cluding rape, burglary, assault, and a prior bombing.261  The most 
critical survey result was that seventy percent of these prospective 
jurors polled felt that the defendants were either guilty or probably 
guilty.262  Judge Fitzgerald concluded: 
The Craciun survey shows that the public in the present case has 
more than a general awareness of the defendants’ crimes.  Large 
portions of the public know specific and prejudicial types of in-
formation, such as the identity of the victims, the motive, and 
prior crimes that may not be admissible at trial.  The survey 
shows that the public knowledge of the defendants bears directly 
on their guilt or innocence.  I find that the survey conducted by 
Craciun & Associates supports the finding and conclusion 
reached that there is a substantial prejudice against the defen-
dants within the prospective juror pool.263 
Interlocutory appeals delayed the Cheely trial for another two 
years.264  In February 1993, Joseph Ryan was indicted as a co-
conspirator in the mail bombing for allegedly providing the explo-
 
 255. Id. at 29. 
 256. Id. at 29–30. 
 257. See CRACIUN 1992 CHEELY POLL, supra note 228, at i (indicating that 67% 
of respondents gave details of the case as it was reported in the media and that 
“[t]he more knowledgeable respondents were of the crime, the more often they 
handed a guilty verdict to both defendants”). 
 258. See id. 
 259. Id. at 12–13. 
 260. Id. at 14. 
 261. See United States v. Cheely, No. A92-073 CR (JKS), at 32, 36, 42 (D. 
Alaska Nov. 13, 1992) (order granting transfer of venue). 
 262. CRACIUN 1992 CHEELY POLL, supra note 228, at 25. 
 263. Cheely, No. A92-073 CR (JKS), at 38 (order granting transfer of venue). 
 264. See, e.g., United States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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sives used in the bomb.265  When the case was remanded for trial, 
the government moved for a ruling vacating the order granting 
change of venue, and even submitted its own public opinion survey 
by the Dittman Research Corporation.266  Cheely commissioned a 
second survey by CRG.267 
The case was assigned to the Honorable James M. Burns, Sen-
ior District Court Judge of Oregon, who refused to vacate Judge 
Fitzgerald’s order granting change of venue: “Based on the results 
of the three public opinion polls and the testimony of Mr. Dittman 
and Ms. Craciun, I am satisfied that the same circumstances which 
led Judge Fitzgerald to find presumed prejudice in November 1992 
continue to prevail.”268 Judge Burns found that the polling data es-
tablished that the prejudice had not dissipated over the two-year 
period: 
I am satisfied that neither the reduction in coverage nor the pur-
ported qualitative changes in the nature of the media coverage 
of this case have resulted in significant loss of memory or change 
of opinion among the population of prospective jurors. 
This conclusion is supported and reflected in the public opinion 
surveys.  The second Craciun survey and the Dittman survey 
show very high community awareness of the details of the mail 
bombing event and the allegations against defendants, including 
the identity of the defendants and their alleged motive.269 
The trial of Cheely and Ryan was moved to Tacoma, Washing-
ton.270  Cheely was convicted and Ryan was acquitted of all charges, 
except for one count of possession of an unregistered explosive de-
vice.271  A trial before a jury tainted by pretrial publicity was 
avoided.  The same could not be said of the trial of Nezar “Mike” 
Khaled Maad in Anchorage in February 2002. 
 
 265. United States v. Cheely, No. A92-073 CR (JKS), at 1 (D. Alaska Dec. 14, 
1994) (order denying motion to vacate Judge Fitzgerald’s order changing venue). 
 266. Id. at 2. 
 267. See CRACIUN & ASSOCIATES, 1993 CHANGE OF VENUE STUDY 
CONDUCTED FOR THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE: IS RAYMOND 
CHEELY GUILTY OR NOT? (1993) [hereinafter CRACIUN 1993 CHEELY POLL]. 
 268. United States v. Cheely, No. A92-073 CR (JKS), at 4 (D. Alaska Dec. 14, 
1994) (order denying motion to vacate Judge Fitzgerald’s order changing venue). 
 269. Id. at 5. 
 270. Id. at 6. 
 271. See United States v. Cheely, No. 95-30248, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 11882 
(9th Cir. May 19, 1997). 
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B. United States v. Maad272 
The Maad case presents a different challenge regarding ad-
verse pretrial publicity.  The Cheely case involved publicity related 
directly to the issue of guilt, much of which would not have been 
admissible at trial.273  In the case of Nezar “Mike” Khaled Maad, 
publicity concerning sensational allegations of uncharged, repre-
hensible conduct in the immediate aftermath of September 11th 
created extreme prejudice in the community for a completely unre-
lated fraud trial.274 
Maad was born and raised in Damascus, Syria.275  He immi-
grated to the United States in 1976, at the age of eighteen, with the 
dream of becoming an airplane pilot.276  Years later, his decision to 
enter flight school in the United States would turn out to be unfor-
tunately significant.  Maad married, started a family, and was un-
able to finish flight school.  He moved to Alaska in 1981, became a 
naturalized United States citizen, and started his own printing 
business in Anchorage. 
Within hours after the terrorist attacks on the United States 
on September 11, 2001, the Editorial Director of the Anchorage 
Daily News contacted Bridge Builders Incorporated,277 a neighbor-
hood strengthening organization that promotes tolerance and un-
derstanding between the diverse ethnic communities of Anchorage.  
The Anchorage Daily News was trying to locate an Arab-American 
Anchorage resident who might be willing to write an appeal for 
tolerance in the community in the wake of the terrorist attacks.  
The executive director of Bridge Builders contacted Maad, who 
was then the Vice President of the organization and had earned a 
reputation as a small businessman with many community contacts.  
After consulting with his family and employees, Maad agreed to 
write a letter to the community for publication in the editorial page 
of the Anchorage Daily News.  Maad’s letter appeared in the paper 
on September 13, 2001, and was entitled Don’t Blame All Arabs for 
Actions of a Few.278  Maad wrote: “On behalf of my family and local 
 
 272. No. A01-0174 CR (JKS) (D. Alaska 2001). 
 273. United States v. Cheely, No. A92-073 CR (JKS), at 29 (D. Alaska Nov. 13, 
1992) (order granting transfer of venue). 
 274. See United States v. Maad, 75 F. App’x 599 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 275. Zaz Hollander, Vandals Trash Print Shop, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, 
Sept. 23, 2001, at A1. 
 276. The majority of the following statements are based on the author’s interac-
tions with Mr. Maad in the author’s capacity as Mr. Maad’s attorney. 
 277. Bridge Builders of Anchorage, http://www.bridgebuilders.ak.org (last vis-
ited Sept. 25, 2005). 
 278. Editorial, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 13, 2001, at B6. 
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members of the Arab-American community, I express our over-
whelming sadness and disbelief that such a horrible act of violence 
could be committed here in the United States, or for that matter, 
anywhere in the world.”279 
Soon after the Anchorage Daily News ran Maad’s letter, the 
Maad family began receiving harassing and threatening phone 
calls.280  Nine days after the publication, the Maads’ printing busi-
ness was vandalized during the night.281  The print shop was broken 
into, hundreds of thousands of dollars of equipment was destroyed, 
and anti-Arab remarks were scrawled on the walls.282  Anchorage 
police quickly concluded that the vandalism was a hate crime and 
called in the FBI to assist in the investigation.283  Over the next sev-
eral months, the FBI was unable to identify any suspects.284 
During that time, the Anchorage community responded to 
help the Maads and to decry the vandalism and anti-Arab back-
lash.285  Bridge Builders oversaw a “Not in Our Town” campaign to 
raise funds to support the Maads and the print shop employees.286  
A $10,000 reward was offered for information concerning the uni-
dentified vandals.287  Within ten weeks, the “Not in Our Town” 
campaign had raised a total of $57,715.288 
Within the highly emotional environment following Septem-
ber 11th, the print shop vandalism and the community’s reaction 
received a great deal of local media attention.  That attention esca-
lated when the FBI investigation, unsuccessful in finding the van-
dals, turned the focus of the investigation to Mike Maad.  On De-
cember 11, 2001, Maad was arrested by the FBI on a bank fraud 
indictment concerning a Small Business Administration loan on 
behalf of the printing business.289  During the bail hearing, and 
without relation to the bank fraud charge, the government an-
 
 279. Id. 
 280. See Hollander, supra note 275, at A1. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. See United States v. Maad, 75 F. App’x. 599, 600 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting 
that the investigation was dropped on December 11, 2001). 
 285. Id. 
 286. Lisa Demer & Lucas Wall, Donors Open Wallets for Print Shop, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 29, 2001, at A1. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Lisa Demer, Not in Our Town Fund Frozen, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, 
Dec. 12, 2001, at A1. 
 289. Lucas Wall, Feds Charge Owner of Print Shop, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, 
Dec. 12, 2001, at A1. 
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nounced to the media that Maad and his wife were suspects in the 
destruction of his print shop.290 
The public reaction was predictable.  The public view of Maad 
immediately changed from that of a courageous spokesperson for 
tolerance to a traitorous scoundrel willing to use the terrorist trag-
edy for personal gain.  Defense counsel for Maad in the bank fraud 
prosecution faced a daunting challenge: How could the defense ad-
dress the heated public reaction to the allegation that Maad van-
dalized his own shop and accepted public donations for his loss in a 
completely unrelated trial?  Once again, the Federal Defender Of-
fice commissioned a public opinion survey by CRG.291 
A telephone survey was conducted from late December 2001 
to early January 2002.292  The survey reflected that Maad had 
quickly become a public figure in the Anchorage community.293  
Seventy-six percent of those polled were aware that Maad had 
been arrested.294  When questioned about their opinion as to guilt 
or innocence, fifty-five percent were willing to say Maad was 
“guilty or probably guilty” of bank fraud, while thirty-five percent 
went so far as to say that he was “guilty or probably guilty” of the 
vandalism.295  This time, when the prejudicial media reports and 
public opinion survey were presented to the District Court, the 
court refused to change venue.296  The court rejected the argument 
that prejudice could be presumed and relied on jury voir dire to 
measure the prejudicial impact of the publicity on the jury venire.297 
The pretrial proceedings of Maad’s fraud trial began in Janu-
ary, 2002, a little more than four months after the vandalism at the 
print shop.298  Although a carefully conducted voir dire by the trial 
judge revealed little evidence of actual prejudice, the polling data 
reflected a contrary public sentiment.299  Maad was convicted, and 
 
 290. Maad, 75 F. App’x. at 600. 
 291. CRACIUN RESEARCH GROUP, INC., FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER DISTRICT 
OF ALASKA: CHANGE OF VENUE STUDY (2002) [hereinafter CRACIUN 2002 MAAD 
POLL]. 
 292. Id. at 5. 
 293. Id. at 3 (indicating that 58% of respondents identified Maad or the shop 
owner as being involved in the vandalism incident). 
 294. Id. at 3. 
 295. Id. at 4. 
 296. United States v. Maad, A01-0174 CR, 5 (JKS), at 5 (D. Alaska Jan. 16, 
2002) (report and recommendation denying change of venue). 
 297. Id. at 2–4. 
 298. Id. at 5. 
 299. See CRACIUN 2002 MAAD POLL, supra note 291, at 3–4. 
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he appealed his conviction exclusively on the theory of presumed 
prejudice.300 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
agreed with Maad that a change of venue should have been 
granted.301  A panel of judges found that the nature and frequency 
of the media coverage concerning Maad was highly prejudicial: 
The Maads were subject to a cascade of publicity.  From the date 
their store was vandalized through the period preceding the trial, 
the four Anchorage television stations broadcast 124 news ac-
counts that related to vandalism of Maad’s print shop, the An-
chorage community’s initial sympathy and support for Maad and 
his wife, the governments [sic] criminal charges of bank fraud 
against Maad, the government’s termination of the hate crime 
investigation, and the government’s statement at Maad’s bail 
hearing that the Maads were suspects of the vandalism at the 
print shop.  And the only daily newspaper in Anchorage, The 
Anchorage Daily News, ran regular front-page stories on the 
print shop vandalism, the outpouring of community support, the 
government’s charges and accusations against Maad, and the 
community’s negative reaction toward Maad after he was named 
a suspect in the vandalism to his store.302 
The Ninth Circuit held that prejudice would be presumed, in spite 
of the record of jury selection that uncovered little evidence of bias 
by the individual jurors questioned: 
At issue here is a claim of presumptive prejudice rather than ac-
tual prejudice. . . . Given the confluence of the extraordinary 
events described above, the district court abused its discretion 
and we reverse the district court’s denial of Maad’s motion for a 
change of venue to a federal court outside of Anchorage.  Those 
events, viewed in their entirety, precluded Maad from obtaining 
a fair trial in Anchorage.303 
C. Why Public Opinion Surveys Work 
Why was there such a drastic discrepancy in the results of the 
public opinion survey and the voir dire in the Maad case?304  More-
over, which was the more accurate gauge of the impact of pretrial 
publicity on the jury?  There are clearly two schools of thought on 
which method is the better measure of prejudice.  One perspective 
was articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia: 
 
 300. United States v. Maad, 75 F. App’x. 599, 601 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. at 600–01. 
 303. Id. at 601. 
 304. See supra notes 298–300 and accompanying text. 
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It is our judgment that in determining whether a fair and impar-
tial jury could be empanelled [sic] the trial court did not err in 
relying less heavily on a poll taken in private by private pollsters 
and paid for by one side than on a recorded, comprehensive voir 
dire examination conducted by the judge in the presence of all 
parties and their counsel pursuant to procedures, practices and 
principles developed by the common law since the reign of 
Henry II.305 
That approach sacrifices the concept of “presumed” prejudice and 
puts all of the eggs of fairness and due process in the “actual” 
prejudice basket.306 
We, on the other hand, would argue that the emphasis should 
be placed on a scientifically valid public opinion survey that can de-
tect bias outside of the pressurized atmosphere of a courtroom.  It 
is exactly because public opinion surveys are “conducted in an at-
mosphere free from the pressure and regimentation of the jury se-
lection process”307 that “[t]he results of properly conceptualized and 
administered surveys provide courts with the best and most inter-
pretable data concerning how the community has internalized and 
responded to information about the crime and the defendant.”308  
People are much more inclined to be honest when questioned by 
unintimidating, unnamed, and relatively unintrusive, neutral re-
searchers, in the comfort of their home, and where there is no 
“wrong” answer that will lead to “dismissal.”  In a professionally 
conducted survey, the fact that the research is administered or fi-
nanced by one party should not influence responses. 
D. The Cost: Wishful Thinking? 
We recognize that the expense of a scientifically designed and 
professionally administered public opinion survey can be prohibi-
tive and beyond the reach of many criminal defendants, public de-
fender agencies, and court-appointed counsel.  However, in those 
few exceptional cases that draw the glare of relentless media cov-
erage, the cost of such research may well be justified.  A public 
opinion survey could be less expensive than lengthy and intensive 
jury voir dire procedures, and certainly would be less expensive 
than the costs of an appellate reversal and retrial. 
The other question Alaska courts should consider is: What is 
the price of justice?  If a public opinion survey is the best way to 
 
 305. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 64  n.43 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 306. See id. 
 307. O’Connell, supra note 32, at 183. 
 308. Thomas Beisecker, The Role of Change of Venue in an Electronic Age, 4 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 86 (1995). 
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analyze the impact of pretrial publicity on the jury venire, as inde-
pendent studies have shown, should the court system automatically 
reject the information a survey could provide in those few cases in 
which pretrial publicity is of substantial concern?  The jurispruden-
tial value of a jury verdict that the public can believe was based on 
evidence presented in a courtroom to a neutral and unbiased jury 
far outweighs the cost of a scientifically based, unbiased market re-
search study. 
Nevertheless, there potentially exists a less expensive alterna-
tive.  A professional public opinion survey is carefully designed to 
elicit honest responses from a representative sample of the jury 
pool.  The same methodology could possibly be used to create a 
questionnaire designed for the specific venire summoned for a trial.  
The questionnaire could accompany the mailed summonses and 
would be completed prior to arrival at the courthouse.  The written 
responses would be evaluated by skilled researchers in the same 
way as those gathered from the general public.  Such an alternative 
would not only properly place the focus on “presumed,” rather 
than “actual” prejudice, it would also be less expensive than a full 
public opinion research project, since it would only be aimed at the 
actual jury panel. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Article suggests that three lessons can be gleaned by 
Alaska courts from the Cheely and Maad cases.  The first is that in 
order to protect the defendant’s right to an impartial jury, the 
change-of-venue analysis must be a two-step process that inde-
pendently analyzes both types of prejudice. This approach ac-
knowledges two realities of our modern world and the criminal jus-
tice system. First, information that is questionable or inadmissible 
at trial but widely disseminated in the community can infect the 
minds of jurors and subvert the principle of an impartial jury.309  
Second, demonstrating the true impact of pretrial publicity on pro-
spective jurors in a courtroom setting is a difficult and perhaps in-
surmountable task for defendants. 
The second lesson of Cheely and Maad arises from the surveys 
conducted in those cases. A scientifically conducted public opinion 
survey is a vital instrument for gauging the impact of prejudicial 
pretrial publicity.310  As was made blatantly evident in the Maad 
case, the true effects of extrajudicial media sources on the prospec-
tive jurors can be better measured by scientifically based research 
 
 309. See id. 
 310. See, e.g., CRACIUN 2002 MAAD POLL, supra note 291, at 3–4. 
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than by the artificial and restrictive process of voir dire.311  A valid 
public opinion survey of the prospective jury pool can measure the 
community’s knowledge of facts and rumors that would be con-
tested by the defense at trial or would not be admissible as evi-
dence, assess the prevalent opinion in the community as to the guilt 
of the defendant, and calculate the strength of that opinion.312  With 
this information, the trial court can determine with confidence 
whether prejudice of the prospective jurors should be presumed.313 
The juxtaposition of the two Cheely prosecutions, state and 
federal, also demonstrates the value of a public opinion survey.  In 
Cheely v. State, the court of appeals concluded that “[o]ne fact that 
emerged from this individual questioning was that, in a large com-
munity such as Anchorage, many residents do not follow media 
coverage of events.”314  The public opinion surveys conducted in 
Cheely proved quite the contrary.315  A majority of people polled 
for the federal trial could recall details from the media publicity: 
67% could recount information about the victims, and 74% identi-
fied revenge as the motive.316  Moreover, 31% volunteered the de-
fendants’ names, unprompted; 21% knew about the defendants’ 
prior crimes; and 71% believed that Cheely was guilty, or probably 
guilty, before he entered a courtroom.317 
Furthermore, while the Alaska courts have consistently de-
clared that a delay of months between pretrial publicity and trial 
“blunts” the impact of that publicity, the second public opinion 
survey in the Cheely II case, conducted over a year later, showed 
that the prejudicial impact on the Anchorage community survived 
several years after the alleged crime.318  The focus of the presumed 
prejudice analysis should be on the nature and extent of the media 
coverage and its actual prevalence in the minds of prospective ju-
rors, in addition to the immutability of their subsequent conclu-
sions about the defendant’s guilt or innocence.  It is unrealistic to 
assume that a delay of a few months between publicity and trial 
will automatically mitigate the impact of prejudicial media cover-
age.319 
 
 311. See supra notes 298–300 and accompanying text. 
 312. See, e.g., CRACIUN 2002 MAAD POLL, supra note 291, at 3–4. 
 313. See, e.g., Maad, 75 F. App’x. at 601. 
 314. 861 P.2d 1168, 1175 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993). 
 315. See CRACIUN 1992 CHEELY POLL, supra note 228, at 12–13. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. at 14, 32, 42, 25. 
 318. CRACIUN 1993 CHEELY POLL, supra note 267, at i (“As in 1992, the com-
bined answers, guilty or probably guilty, add to 71%”). 
 319. See id. 
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The third lesson of these cases is that expressed by Justice 
Thomas Clark almost forty years ago: “[W]e must remember that 
reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial meas-
ures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception.”320  Accurately 
ascertaining the bias in a community, and moving venue in the few 
cases that require it, is not only economical but also minimizes the 
damage of appellate reversals to all facets of justice. 
Alaska courts can revitalize the rights to a fair and impartial 
jury trial, as guaranteed by the Alaska Constitution, by reevaluat-
ing the application of the Mallott standard of presumed prejudice.321  
The focus should be on the honest recognition of the tremendous 
impact the media can have, even on large communities, in a state 
with such a small population.  Moreover, the best way to measure 
that impact accurately is through a valid public opinion survey.  
The same type of scientifically based market research information 
that explores, assists, and explains commercial, governmental and 
political decision-making at all levels of our community should cer-
tainly be an acceptable tool in the decision-making process of a 
trial judge.  And, if use of this “gold standard” in evaluating the 
impact of pretrial publicity for purposes of presumed prejudice 
analysis is not practical, a possible alternative is to employ the 
same methodology used in scientifically based surveys to elicit hon-
est, uninfluenced, and uninhibited responses to a pre-trial juror 
questionnaire.  This questionnaire should be provided to prospec-
tive jurors in the privacy of their homes prior to their appearance 
for jury duty, and the results should be analyzed for the parties and 
the court by experienced researchers.   
If, however, Alaska courts still rely on the jury selection proc-
ess to measure the impact of pretrial publicity on jurors, they must, 
at a minimum, be cognizant of the presumed prejudice and actual 
prejudice dichotomy and that this bifurcation of prejudice review 
provides separate, and equally vital, safeguards of the right to an 
impartial jury.  Furthermore, in those few cases where jury bias is a 
concern, the trial courts should at least be receptive to extensive in-
court written questionnaires and individual voir dire, perhaps even 
in chambers where jurors can feel more comfortable revealing per-
sonal views that have been irreparably influenced by unsanctioned 
sources.  The alternative is that criminal defendants who have been 
“tried” in the press will walk into a courtroom with a presumption 
of guilt rather than innocence. 
 
 320. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966). 
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